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SAME-GENDER HARASSMENT AND
HOMOSEXUALITY IN TITLE VII
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LITIGATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)' forbids sexual
harassmene involving victims and harassers of opposite genders? A
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to
"discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's... sex." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). The statute prohibits public and private employers with fifteen or more
employees, see id. § 2000e(b), from hiring, promoting, bestowing benefits on, or
discharging any employee in such a discriminatory manner. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
Aggrieved employees may sue their employer to recover actual damages, including back
pay, reinstatement, and promotion, see id. § 2000e-5(g)(1), as well as limited punitive and
compensatory damages. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
There are two types of sexual harassment actionable under Title VII: "quid pro quo"
harassment and "hostile work environment" harassment. McWilliams v. Fairfax County
Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1194-95 (4th Cir. 1996). Quid pro quo sexual
harassment exists when an individual's employment status is conditioned upon the
submission to sexual requests by his or her employer. Id. at 1195. Under this theory a
plaintiff must allege and prove: (I) the plaintiff employee is a member of the protected
class; (2) the sexual advances were unwelcome; (3) the harassment was sexually
motivated; (4) the employee's reaction to the supervisor's advances affected a tangible
aspect of her employment; and (5) respondeat superior liability has been established.
Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st Cir. 1990). But see Nichols v.
Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding the five part test unduly complex and
holding quid pro quo harassment occurs when an "individual explicitly or implicitly
conditions a job, a job benefit, or the absence of a job detriment, upon an employee's
Washington University Open Scholarship
444 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:443
growing number of Title VII plaintiffs, however, are now alleging "same-
gender"4 sexual harassment-harassment by supervisors of the same
gender as the plaintiff employee.5 Whether Title VII protects employees
acceptance of sexual conduct").
Hostile work environment harassment typically does not affect the plaintiff employee's
employment or economic status, rather it deprives the employee of the right to work in an
environment "free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Meritor Say.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). In addition to proving the five elements
required in a quid pro quo claim, a hostile work environment plaintiff must also show that
the harassment complained of was "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67
(quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1lth Cir. 1982)). See also
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05 (outlining the elements of a hostile work environment claim).
Furthermore, courts require the plaintiff subjectively perceive the conduct as abusive,
and that the harassment would have similarly affected a reasonable person in the same
situation. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). A plaintiff need not
demonstrate psychological injury to prevail in a hostile environment case. Id. For a
general discussion of Title VII's sexual harassment framework, see Trish K. Murphy, Note,
Without Distinction: Recognizing Coverage of Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1125, 1126-30 (1995).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting an employer from discriminating against an
employee with respect to his "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
... [the employee's] sex"). See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57 (recognizing sexual
harassment claims under Title VII where the supervisor and the employee were of the
opposite sex). See also Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning Of "Sex": Homosexual and
Bisexual Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55 (1995); Murphy, supra note 2;
Lisa Wehren, Note, Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VI Garcia v. Elf
Atochem Marks a Step in the Wrong Direction, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 87, 88 (1995).
4. Because "sex" equates to "gender" under Title VII, the author employs the term
"same-gender" as opposed to "same-sex." See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
5. At least fifteen district courts addressed this issue in 1995. See, e.g., Sardinia v.
Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995)
(noting that "[n]o fewer than fifteen district court decisions addressed the viability of
same-sex claims in 1995 alone" and holding same-sex discrimination claims actionable
under Title VII). See generally Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 909 F. Supp. 367
(W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding same-gender sexual harassment is not cognizable under Title
VII); Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding same-
sex sexual harassment is cognizable under Title VII where a female plaintiff alleged sexual
harassment at the hands of a female co-worker); Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico,
890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995) (finding the plain language of Title VII prohibits same-sex
harassment); Boyd v. Vonnahmen, No. 93-CV-4358, 1995 WL 420040 (S.D. I11. Mar. 29,
1995) (declining to read Title VII as applicable only to cases of heterosexual sexual
harassment); Fox v. Sierra Dev. Co., 876 F. Supp. 1169 (D. Nev. 1995) (ruling that a
heterosexual man's offense at homosexual depictions will not by itself constitute a Title
VII claim); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A.94-1483, 1995 WL
133349 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995) (following Garcia).
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from same-gender sexual harassment remains unsettled.6 Complicating
this issue is the related question of the role of sexual orientation in
sexual harassment litigation.7
The controversy over whether Title VII protections extend to sexual
orientation, in tandem with a dearth of legislative history, has fostered
judicial reluctance to consider this issue.8 The United States Supreme
Court has not addressed same-gender sexual harassment, but two United
States Courts of Appeal have ruled on these issues.9 In 1994, in Garcia
v. Elf Atochem North America,0 the Fifth Circuit held a plaintiff does
not have a valid claim for same-gender sexual harassment under Title
VII " Prior to Garcia, many courts confronting same-gender sexual
harassment held Title VII prohibited such conduct. 2 After Garcia,
In addition, in the first 40 days of 1996, at least two district courts addressed this issue.
See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100 (D.D.C.
Feb. 5, 1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that same-gender sexual harassment is not
actionable under Title VII); Ton v. Information Resources, Inc., No. 95-3565C, 1996 WL
5322 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 3, 1996) (holding Title VII prohibits same-gender sexual harassment).
See also McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996)
(providing an expressly narrow holding that in hostile work environment cases Title VII
does not recognize claims of heterosexual-male-on-heterosexual-male sexual harassment).
6. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1125-26 (noting federal district courts are issuing
conflicting opinions concerning same-gender harassment).
7. See, e.g., McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1195-96 (holding the plaintiff's hostile
environment claim was insufficient because the male-plaintiff's"alleged harassers were...
males, and no claim is made that any was homosexual").
8. See Calleros, supra note 3, at 56-57 (noting the difficulties courts have recognizing
homosexual harassment).
9. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1191; Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th
Cir. 1994). See also infra notes 10-19.
10. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
11. Id. at 451-52. See also Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D.
I11. 1988) (rejecting male plaintiff's claim of same-gender harassment).
12. See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala. 1983)
(noting that homosexual harassment violates Title VII), affd mem., 749 F.2d 732 (11th
Cir. 1984); Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs. Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. I11. 1981)
(finding a cause of action under Title VII when a male employee's refusal of a male
supervisor's homosexual advances resulted in termination); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating with little discussion that homosexual harassment
violated Title VII). See also Calleros, supra note 3, at 65-70 (proposing that the
heterosexual harassment framework applies to homosexual harassment).
In addition, several states have recognized same-gender sexual harassment under state
law. Id. See also Mogilefsky v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116, 121 (Ct. App.
1993) (holding that a victim of same-gender harassment may state a cause of action for
1996]
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however, many district courts followed the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and
ruled Title VII does not protect same-gender sexual harassment
claims. 13 Today, federal courts remain divided on the issue.'
4
In the only other circuit court case on this issue, the Fourth Circuit,
in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,5 issued a
narrow holding.' 6 Like Garcia, the McWilliams court held Title VII
does not allow same-gender heterosexual-on-heterosexual hostile work
environment claims,'7 but it did note such claims may be cognizable if
one party is a homosexual.' McWilliams suggests years of fact-specific
circuit court decisions, and suggests these issues will enter the twenty-
first century unresolved. 9
This Section will consider the issues concerning same-gender
harassment and homosexuality. Part II provides a brief background on
the enactment and operation of Title VII. Part III examines the Garcia
court's reasoning and the reasoning of other courts that have refused to
sexual harassment under a California statute); Barbour v. Department of Social Servs., 497
N.W.2d 216, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (allowing a same-gender sexual
harassment claim under the Michigan Civil Rights Act); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,
626 A.2d 445, 454 (NJ. 1993) (stating the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination applies
to sexual harassment between members of the same gender).
13. See Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489, 494 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Quick
v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1295-96 (S.D. Iowa 1995); Benekritis v. Johnson,
882 F. Supp. 521, 525-26 (D.S.C. 1995); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, No.
CIV.A.94-1483, 1995 WL 133349, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995); Myers v. City of El
Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., No. C-3-
94-1826, 1995 WL 386793, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1995). But see Raney v. District
of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286-88 (D.D.C. 1995) (rejecting Garcia and allowing a
male employee's Title VII claim of sexual harassment by his male supervisor); Pritchett
v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., No. CIV.A.93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *2
(E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995) (allowing a female employee's Title VII claim of sexual
harassment by her female supervisor); Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (allowing a Title VII action where a
homosexual male supervisor harassed a male employee but did not similarly harass female
employees).
14. See Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (noting the split among courts).
15. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
16. Id. at 1195-96.
17. Id. at 1195.
18. Id. at 1195 n.4.
19. See id (noting that "the lower federal courts which have [decided this issue] are
hopelessly divided").
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allow same-gender sexual harassment claims. Part IV describes the
rationale of courts that have approved same-gender claims. Part V
discusses the application of Title VII to homosexual sexual harassment
litigants. Finally, Part VI concludes that same-gender harassment claims
are actionable under Title VII and suggests that courts focus on the
harassing conduct and the gender of the victim, rather than the sexual
orientation of the parties.
II. THE STATUTE
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196420 makes it unlawful for
an employer to discriminate against any employee because of that
employee's sex.2 The statute prohibits an employer with fifteen or
more employees' from hiring, promoting, bestowing benefits on, or
discharging any employee in a discriminatory manner." Aggrieved
employees may sue the employer to recover actual damages, including
back pay, reinstatement, and promotion,24 as well as limited punitive
and compensatory damages."
Congress enacted Title VII to eradicate employment practices that
discriminate against individuals based on "race, color, religion, sex or
national origin."26 "Sex," however, was added as a protected category
in a last minute attempt to thwart the passage of the statute. As a
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aXl ). The provision states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining "employer").
23. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
24. Id. § 2000e-5(g).
25. Civil RightsActof 1991, § 102(b)(I),42U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). In 1991, Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Act to expand Title VII damages to include punitive and
compensatory damages. Id. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1491
(1994) ("[A] Title VII plaintiff who wins a backpay award may also seek compensatory
damages.... [and] punitive damages.").
26. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
27. See Mark Musson, Comment, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Time
Has Come for All Offenders to Personally Suffer the Consequences of Their Actions, 64
1996]
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result, the scant legislative history does not give a clear indication of
Congress' intent regarding sex discrimination in the workplace.28
Therefore, the federal courts are split over whether Congress intended
Title VII to encompass same-gender sexual harassment.29
III. THE RATIONALE FOR REJECTING SAME-GENDER
HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER TITLE VII
Courts that reject same-gender harassment view discrimination as an
abuse of power by a powerful person-the employer-against a
vulnerable one-the employee." The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, in Goluszek v. H. P. Smith,3' was the
first court to rely on this theory when deciding a same-gender sexual
harassment claim.32 In Goluszek, the court concluded that Congress did
not contemplate same-gender harassment when it enacted Title VIIL3
Instead, the court determined that Congress created Title VII to prohibit
discrimination "stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of
that imbalance by the powerful which results in discrimination against a
discrete and vulnerable group."'34
UMKC L. REv. 237, 237 (1995) (discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
28. See generally id. at 237-43. Some members of Congress have proposed
amendments to Title VII prohibiting discrimination against employees on the basis of
sexual preference. Id.
29. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
30. See Goluszekv. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il1. 1988) (citing Note,
Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L.
REv. 1449, 1451-52 (1994)).
31. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. I11. 1988).
32. Id. at 1456. One cannot overstate Goluszek's impact on the same-gender sexual
harassment debate. See Sardinia v. Deliwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995 WL
640502 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) ("Every case ... disclosed by research to support the
proposition that this Circuit should not recognize same-sex harassment claims relies in
whole or in part on [Goluszek].").
33. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456. Goluszek, a male employee, worked in a "male-
dominated environment!' Id. The other male employees consistently harassed Goluszek
from the day he was hired in 1979 until he was fired in 1984. Id. at 1453-55. Goluszek
filed a sexual harassment claim alleging his employer sexually discriminated against him
by not preventing the harassment. Id. at 1455.
34. Id.
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Although Goluszek worked in "a male-dominated environment,""5
the court rejected his same-gender harassment claim because it did not
involve an "environment that treated males as inferior."'36 Rather, the
only sexual harassment claims the court viewed as actionable were those
stemming from "words or actions that [say] the victim is inferior because
of the victim's sex."3" Because the male-on-male harassment did not
create an atmosphere where males were inferior, the court implied that
same-gender harassment is impossible."
Six years later, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 9 the
Fifth Circuit followed Goluszek when it decided the viability of same-
gender harassment claims under Title VII.40 In Garcia, a male plaintiff
alleged his male supervisor harassed him by grabbing his crotch area
from behind and making sexual motions." The Fifth Circuit held
"[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate does not
state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual
overtones.' ' 2 Although the court did not provide its own rationale, it
did cite Goluszek with approval.43
Although several district courts have followed the Fifth Circuit's
ruling in Garcia, many other district courts have openly rejected
Garcia." Although no circuit court has directly opposed Garcia,
several circuit courts have implicitly approved same-gender claims under
Title VII.45 Finally, other district courts, while not expressly rejecting
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
39. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
40. Id. at 451-52.
41. Id. at 448.
42. Id. at 451-52 (quoting a Fifth Circuit decision that was published without opinion,
Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 311 (1993)).
43. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 452.
44. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
45. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that
"[slexual harassment of women by men is the most common kind, but we do not mean to
exclude the possibility that sexual harassment of men by women, or men by other men,
or women by other women would not also be actionable in proper cases"); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "although words
from a man to a man are differently received than words from a man to a woman, we do
not rule out the possibility that both men and women... [employees] have viable claims
1996]
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Garcia, have refused to preclude same-gender sexual harassment under
Title VII.
46
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR REJECTING GARCIA AND APPROVING
SAME-GENDER SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Courts that recognize same-gender sexual harassment claims focus
on the plain language of Title VII, the legislative history and the
because-of-gender requirement.47 In addition, many courts criticize the
Goluszek and Garcia lines of cases.48
A. Reading the Plain Language of Title VII to Allow
Same-Gender Claims
Numerous courts rely on the plain language of Title VII to hold
employers liable for same-gender sexual harassment claims. 49 In Easton
against [the harasser] for sexual harassment"); Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp.,
4 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 1993) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) (stating that "harassment
is harassment regardless of whether it is caused by a member of the same or opposite
sex"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901
F.2d 186, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1990) (hearing an allegation of homosexual harassment but
affirming summary judgment for the defendant because the alleged conduct was not
severe).
46. See, e.g., Nogueras v. University of Puerto Rico, 890 F. Supp. 60 (D.P.R. 1995)
(holding that the plain language of Title VII prohibits same-gender sexual harassment);
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (holding same-
gender sexual harassment based on gender is actionable only where a homosexual
supervisor harasses employees of the same sex); Roe v. K-Mart Corp., No. CIV.A.2:93-
2372-18AJ, 1995 WL 316783, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 28, 1995) (holding a claim of same-
gender sexual harassment actionable under Title VII where a male homosexual employee
was allegedly terminated because he refused a male homosexual supervisor's sexual
advances); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229,231-32 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (concluding homosexual harassment and same-gender harassment violate Title
VII where the female employee can prove that the harasser only harassed women and not
men).
47. See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100
(D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1996).
48. Id. at *8.
49. Id. at *8-*9. See also Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995
WL 640502, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (stating "[n]othing in the body of the statute
limits its protections to heterosexual harassment. On the contrary, the language of the
statute is non-exclusive, creating a 'broad rule of workplace equality"') (quoting Harris v.
Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993)); Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905
F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("IThe plain language of Title VII ... does not
preclude a same-gender sexual harassment claim... . "); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885
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v. Crossland Mortgage Corp.,50 the court stated that, "[i]f heterosexual
sexual harassment was the sole kind of sexual harassment Congress
sought to outlaw, they could have written the statute to only encompass
claims brought by members of the opposite sex of the harasser."51 The
Easton court concluded that tribunals that refuse to recognize same-
gender harassment claims "have ignored the plain language of the statute
and undertaken an unnecessary excursion into the mist shrouded
netherworld of congressional intent."52
In Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co.,53 the
court relied on the lack of qualifying language for the term "sex."54
The Prescott court recognized that Congress chose "an obviously gender
neutral term, just as Congress chose to prohibit discrimination based on
'race,' rather than discrimination against African-Americans or other
specific minorities." 55  Therefore, a plaintiff may argue Congress
purposely employed a gender neutral term because the language in Title
VII does not limit the Act's prohibitions to cross-gender discrimina-
tion.'
B. The Legislative History
Courts have interpreted the lack of legislative history and the
uncertain congressional intent to reach contrary results concerning Title
VII's prohibition of same-gender harassment." Indeed, the lack of
F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (recognizing that Title VII prohibits
discrimination "against women because they are women and against men because they are
men"). But see Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 834 (D. Md.
1994) (holding where harasser and victim share the same gender, the language of Tite VII
would be "strained beyond its manifest intent were the Court to hold that under these facts
there has been discrimination 'because of... sex"').
50. 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
51. Id. at 1378.
52. Id.
53. 878 F. Supp. 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
54. Id. at 1550.
55. Id.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
57. See Musson, supra note 27, at 237 (discussing Title VII's legislative history). See
also Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100, at *7
(D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1996) (citing cases permitting same-gender sexual harassment claims);
Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 1, 1995) (listing various decisions).
1996]
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legislative history is a source of constant frustration for courts faced with
same-gender sexual harassment claims.5 8  Courts that approve same-
gender claims argue the dearth of legislative history renders fruitless the
quest to determine congressional intent.59 These courts argue that while
one may ignore the plain language of Title VII, one will not find any
congressional intent to exclude same-gender harassment suits from the
statute's purview.'Courts that reject same-gender harassment claims, however, also
find support in the lack of legislative history.6' These courts reason
that "[t]he total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment
coupled with the circumstances of the amendment's adoption clearly
indicates that Congress never considered nor intended that [Title VIII
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex."6
C. Varying Application of the But-for-Gender Test
Courts that allow same-gender claims hinge their analysis on Title
VI's but-for-gender requirement." Using the plain meaning
doctrine,' courts construe the word sex in Title VII to mean gender.65
58. See supra notes 12-14 for a list of cases wherein courts have come to different
conclusions regarding congressional intent, and have ruled differently on the issue of same-
gender harassment under Title VII.
59. See, e.g., Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368, 1378 (C.D. Cal.
1995) (noting that courts that have precluded same-gender harassment claims have
"undertaken an unnecessary excursion into the mist shrouded netherworld of congressional
intent").
60. See Musson, supra note 27, at 240-42 (arguing that Congress could not have
intended to protect a vulnerable person from a dominant person, otherwise white plaintiffs
would not be able to seek protection under Title VII).
61. See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 1085.
63. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545,
1550-51 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (applying the because-of-gender test for a claim of same-gender
harassment).
64. See, e.g., Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (instructing courts to give words their common
and ordinary meaning in the absence of legislative intent).
65. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (concluding that Title VII prohibits discrimination "because-of-gender").
Several courts have noted that gender is the traditional meaning of the word sex and
reason that because it is used in the same context as race, color and national origin, which
are traditionally understood to describe immutable characteristics, Congress merely
intended sex to be given its traditional interpretation. E.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol50/iss1/17
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In Williams v. District of Columbia,' the court asked whether the
plaintiff suffered the harassment because of his or her gender.67 This
analysis broadens the scope of Title VII and allows same-gender
claims."
In contrast, courts that follow Goluszek and Garcia find gender
discrimination when there is evidence of an abuse of an imbalance of
power.69 In other words, members of the same sex would not treat
fellow members as inferior due to their gender.7" The Goluszek court
explained that a male plaintiff, working in a male-dominated environ-
ment, could not work in an environment that treats males as inferior.7
Thus, according to this argument, sexual harassment based on gender
exists only when the victim and the harasser are of different genders.72
D. Analytical Flaws in the Reasoning of Goluszek & Garcia
Courts that have recently held same-gender harassment claims
actionable under Title VII also suggest analytical problems with
Goluszek's rationale.7" First, courts criticizing Goluszek note that "the
support underlying [Goluszek's] central proposition came not from
Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 832 n.17 (D. Md. 1994) (stating courts have read sex under
Title VII as gender); Parrish v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 89.C.4515, 1990 WL
165611, at *7 n.2 (N.D. I11. Oct. 16, 1990) (concluding Title VII prohibits discrimination
based on gender). See also Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085 (arguing the lack of legislative history
and the circumstances surrounding the enactment of Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination indicate Congress intended Title VII apply to the traditional concept of sex);
DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 l'.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1979) (arguing that sex
means gender because "Congss had only the traditional notions of 'sex' in mind")
(quoting Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977)).
66. No. CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1996).
67. Id. at *6-*7.
68. Id. (noting that "Title VII broadly prohibits all forms of sex discrimination, which
includes sexual harassment").
69. Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I11. 1988). See supra
notes 30-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale of Garcia and
Goluszek and their progeny.
70. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (explaining that the harassment did not create
an anti-male environment). See, e.g., Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp.
822, 834 (D. Md. 1994) (following Goluszek's rationale).
71. Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
72. Id.
73. See e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100, at
*8-*9 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1996) (listing seven analytical flaws in Goluszek).
1996]
Washington University Open Scholarship
454 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 50:443
Congress, but from a law student."'74 Moreover, the law student wrote
the precedent-inspiring law review note before the Supreme Court
decided Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,75 which emphasized that
harassment based on the victim's sex is gender-based harassment and
violates Title VII.76 The Williams court criticized Garcia and Goluszek
for violating Meritor's command.77 The Goluszek court departed from
Meritor when it struck Goluszek's claim, even though it acknowledged
that the other employees may have harassed him because of his
gender.78
In addition, it would be inconsistent to apply the abuse of power
theory to reject same-gender harassment claims but allow reverse
discrimination claims. 79 If a court applies the abuse of power theory in
a race discrimination claim, then a white plaintiff, a member of the
majority, would not be allowed to bring a reverse discrimination
claim.8 Such a result, Goluszek's critics argue, is contrary to Congress'
intent.8'
Furthermore, the Williams court interpreted the holding of Goluszek
as narrow, but overextended by its progeny. 2 Williams argued that the
Goluszek court rejected same-gender sexual harassment because the male-
on-male harassment did not involve an abuse of power.83 But, as the
Williams court noted, even if a court adopts the imbalance of power
theory, not all same-gender sexual harassment claims occur in a vacuum
74. Id. at *8 n.7 (discussing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work
Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)). The Williams
court also noted that the student note did not discuss congressional intent. Id.
75. 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
76. Id.
77. Williams, 1996 WL 56100, at *9.
78. Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also
Williams, 1996 WL 56100, at *9 (criticizing Goluszek's departure from Meritor); Sardinia
v. Deliwood Foods, Inc., No. 94 CIV.5458, 1995 WL 640502, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1,
1995) (same).
79. Williams, 1996 WL 56100, at *9.
80. See, e.g., Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545,
1550 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (stating that the Supreme Court has recognized reverse
discrimination) (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)).
81. Id.
82. Williams v. District of Columbia, CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL 56100, at *9 (D.D.C.
Feb. 5, 1996).
83. Id.
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devoid of any abuse of power." Williams also argued that the "harms
resulting from same-sex sexual harassment are no less severe than those
perpetrated by harassers of the opposite sex." 5
Finally, many courts point out that a rule rejecting same-gender
sexual harassment claims conflicts with the policy of Title VII's
enforcement body, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)." The EEOC Compliance Manual states:
The victim does not have to be of the opposite sex from the
harasser. Since sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
the crucial inquiry is whether the harasser treats a member or
members of one sex differently from members of the other sex. The
victim and the harasser may be of the same sex where, for instance,
the sexual harassment is based on the victim's sex (not on the
victim's sexual preference) and the harasser does not treat
employees of the opposite sex the same way."
For these reasons, federal courts are split as to whether same-gender
sexual harassment claims are protected under Title VII. s8  One
additional factor, however, further clouds the murky waters of same-
gender harassment litigation: sexual orientation often complicates the
application of the but-for-gender test. 9
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2 (1981)). See also CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 206 (1979) (stating that
"[a] woman who is fired because of her refusal to submit to a lesbian supervisor is just as
fired--and her firing is just as related to her gender-as if the perpetrator were a man").
86. See, e.g., Williams, 1996 WL 56100, at *9.
87. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615.2(b)(3), at 3204 (1991). The Manual also states:
If a male supervisor of male and female employees makes unwelcome sexual
advances toward a male employee because the employee is male but does not make
similar advances toward female employees, then the male supervisor's conduct may
constitute sexual harassment since the disparate treatment is based on the male
employee's sex.
Id. at ex. 1.
88. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text. See also supra note 12 for cases
that approve same-gender sexual harassment claims.
89. See infra part V.
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V. THE ROLE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IN
SAME-GENDER HARASSMENT CLAIMS
Both the EEOC and the courts agree that Title VII does not prohibit
workplace discrimination based on an employee's sexual orientation."
Rather, Title VII prohibits gender discrimination." Many same-gender
harassment claims, however, involve at least one party that is admitted,
perceived or alleged to be homosexual.92
The confusion occurs when a court is confronted with an instance
of same-gender harassment based on sexual orientation.93 This may
occur when a supervisor harasses with words or actions indicating either
anti-homosexual or anti-heterosexual animus toward an employee of the
same gender.94 Similarly, it may occur when a supervisor demands
sexual favors from an employee who shares the supervisor's gender. 5
90. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1995). See also
Wiliamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1089 (1990); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1979); Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1978); Fredette v.
BVP Management Assocs., 905 F. Supp. 1034 (M.D. Fla. 1995). See generally Samuel
A. Marcosson, Harassment on the Basis of Sexual Orientation: A Claim of Sex
Discrimination Under Title VII, 81 GEO. L.J. 1, 3 (1992) (discussing sexual-orientation
harassment). See inflra notes 113-17 and accompanying text (discussing Wright).
Although Title VII does not protect homosexuals from harassment based on their sexual
orientation, it does protect employees from sexual harassment by homosexuals. See
Wright v. Methodist Youth Servs., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. II1. 1981) (holding
that but for the male employee's gender, a homosexual male supervisor would not have
harassed him).
91. Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1297 (quoting DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 329-30).
92. See, e.g., King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 163 (E.D. Pa. 1995);
Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., 909 F. Supp. 367 (W.D.N.C. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz
Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Va. 1995); Fredette, 905 F. Supp. at 1038;
Quick, 895 F. Supp. at 1292; Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 286
(D.D.C. 1995); EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995);
Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537,539 (M.D. Ala. 1983); Methodist Youth
Serv., 511 F. Supp. at 308.
93. See Dillon v. Frank, No. 90-2290, 1992 WL 5436, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1992)
("[Homosexual male employee] contends that he was subjected to this abuse relating to
homosexuality solely because he was a man.... ."). See generally Marcosson, supra note
90, at 14 (concluding that Title VII recognizes harassment based on sexual orientation).
94. See supra note 87 for an example of how a supervisor may harass an individual
because of his or her gender.
95. See Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 539 (testifying that a male supervisor requested
homosexual favors from a male subordinate).
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In both same-gender harassment scenarios, sexual orientation is likely the
motivating factor, otherwise if the employee had been of the opposite
gender, he or she would not have suffered the harassment.6 Therefore,
the crucial inquiry to determine if such harassment was based on gender
should not be whether the harasser selected the victim because of their
sexual orientation." Rather, courts must examine the nature of the
harassing conduct and its impact on the victim relative to the treatment
of members of the opposite gender.9"
Similarly, same-gender harassment may occur when an alleged
harasser harasses both men and women for failing to conform to the
stereotypical vision of either gender." Thus, when the alleged harasser
denigrates an employee with an anti-orientation animus or propositions
either men or women regardless of their sexuality, then the employee's
gender plays a causal role in the harassment."° Thus, the harassment
is based on the victim's sexual orientation and their gender.
However, if the alleged perpetrator harasses members of both sexes,
the but-for-gender question is not easily answered.'"' Some courts and
commentators suggest that one may escape liability by harassing
homosexual men and women equally, or by harassing all men and
women equally. 2 Others conclude that such conduct is more likely
96. See McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Setvs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.
Ga. 1995) (allowing the plaintiff to prove that "her harasser only harassed women and ....
did not treat men in a similar fashion").
97. See, e.g., Williams v. District of Columbia, No. CIV.A.94-02727, 1996 WL56100,
at *7 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1996) (stating "Title VII makes no distinction based upon sexual
orientation: the determinative question is not the orientation of the harasser, but whether
the sexual harassment would have occurred but for the gender of the victim").
98. See McCoy, 878 F. Supp. at 232 (examining how a female harasser treated
employees of the opposite gender).
99. See Marcosson, supra note 90, at 24-27.
100. Id.
101. See Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 339 n.3 (E.D. Va.
1995) (arguing such a case does not constitute sex discrimination because there is no
disparate treatment).
102. See, e.g., Gross v. BurggrafConstr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding
plaintiff did not establish a discriminatory hostile work environment based on supervisor's
harsh language while reprimanding all employees); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d
99, 105 (2d Cir.) (noting that the sexual harassment claim was time-barred, but the record
showed the supervisor's "temper was manifested indiscriminately toward men and
women"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988). See also Murphy, supra note 2, at 1149
(discussing the possibility of an escape hatch for bisexual or equal opportunity harassers).
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to create two sexual harassment claims. 3 This conclusion rests on the
theory that harassment of men and women may differ in nature."°
Another question to consider is whether a harasser's or victim's
homosexuality may save an otherwise inactionable same-gender
harassment claim.' In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of
Supervisors,"6 the Fourth Circuit, while dismissing a same-gender
harassment claim, 7 suggested a claim involving a homosexual
harasser or victim would be cognizable.' In essence, the McWilliams
court required the plaintiff to prove the harasser's sexual orientation.0 9
To avoid this based-on-gender versus based-on-sexual-orientation
dilemma, the court should disregard sexual orientation and focus on the
nature of the harassing conduct and the gender of the parties."0 This
approach would eliminate the plaintiffs burden of proving "the 'true'
sexual orientation of the harasser."'' Conversely, consideration of the
sexual orientation of the parties will bar hetero-on-hetero harassment
claims even though such harassment may be as severe and pervasive as
harassment by different sexes. Further, it signals tacit endorsement of
gay-bashing conduct.
Courts should find harassment based on a victim's gender if the
alleged harasser treated members of one sex differently."2 Courts can
answer this question without reference to sexual orientation. First, courts
should ask whether the alleged harasser similarly harassed other
employees not of the same gender as the plaintiff. Second, courts should
103. See Murphy, supra note 2, at 1148-49.
104. Id. (explaining how a supervisor harassed the men for their lack of prowess and
harassed the women for being sexual objects).
105. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
106. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 1195. The court reasoned that Congress did not intend the word sex in
Title VII to reach conduct concerning sex, but rather specifically gender. Id. at 1196.
108. Id. at 1195 n.4.
109. Id. at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting).
110. Id. See generally Murphy, supra note 2; Calleros, supra note 3.
111. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1198 (4th Cir.
1996) (Michael, J., dissenting).
112. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 372 (1993) (Ginsburg J.,
concurring) (stating that "t[h]e critical issue ... is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed").
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examine the alleged harasser's specific words or acts and ask whether the
plaintiff would have been subjected to either, had he or she been of the
opposite gender.
The holding of Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc."' fol-
lowed this rationale. The Wright court found that but for the male
employee's gender, a homosexual male supervisor would not have
harassed him." 4 The plaintiff proved that the supervisor did not make
the same demands on a female employee.' Even though Title VII
does not protect homosexuals from harassment based on their sexual
orientation,"6 the court in Wright held that Title VII did protect an
employee from being sexually harassed by a homosexual." 7 As a
result, a homosexual may be sued for sexual harassment, but may not
have a remedial avenue if he is the victim of sexual harassment.
In contrast, the reasoning of Goluszek and Garcia does grant Title
VII coverage to homosexual plaintiffs. A homosexual plaintiff can argue
that, as a minority, he is vulnerable to domination by the majority
population of heterosexuals."' Thus, when a supervisor harasses an
employee because the employee is a homosexual male (i.e., the
supervisor does not harass homosexual female employees), the supervisor
is discriminating against a vulnerable group, which is consistent with the
Garcia court's reading of Title VII" 9 Applying the Garcia court's
rationale, a homosexual employee would have a valid claim under Title
VII. The current trend indicates that courts are rejecting the reasoning
of Goluszek and Garcia, and are approving same-gender claims based on
an application of the but-for-gender test, which ignores sexual
orientation. 2°
113. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. I11. 1981).
114. Id. at 310.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
117. Wright, 511 F. Supp. at 310.
118. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing the abuse in power
theory).
119. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 12 & 49 for a list of cases discussing the application of the but-
for-gender test.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Growing numbers of district courts allow same-gender sexual
harassment claims under Title VII; however, it is difficult to predict
whether circuit courts will follow suit. The lack of legislative history
and the inconsistent interpretations of the statute's language signal
disagreement among the circuits. The controversial factor of a litigant's
sexual orientation need not complicate the process.
To apply Title VII to homosexual sexual harassment claims, the
courts should ignore sexual orientation and focus on the harasser's
conduct and the victim's gender. The alternate approach described in
McWilliams, which requires proof of sexual orientation to satisfy the but-
for-gender inquiry, may chill litigation if the victim is afraid of exposing
his sexual orientation as a factor underlying the alleged harassment. In
addition, if the courts apply a strict reading of Title VII that does not
cover claims involving homosexual plaintiffs, the courts are in essence
endorsing gay bashing in the workplace.
The Supreme Court or the United States Congress must address
Title VII's application to same-gender harassment.' 2' As the EEOC
writes, "resolution of [this issue] is important to the EEOC's enforcement
efforts and to an individual's ability to be free of employment
discrimination in the workplace."'"
121. In recent years a number of Representatives and Senators have introduced
legislation directed at workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation. Although the
appropriate committees have considered each proposal, they have not proceeded further
in the legislative process. See H.R. 1863, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); H.R. 382, 104th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1995) (amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of affectional or sexual orientation); S. 932, 104th Cong., Ist Sess. (1995) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation); H.R. 431, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation, actual or
perceived).
122. Amicus Curiae Brief of the EEOC at 1, Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335
(E.D. Va. 1995). One commentator states:
Cases that deny Title VII coverage to gay or lesbian same-gender harassment
claims ultimately turn on the idea that there is some special exemption in Title VII
to avoid protecting homosexuals. The result is to deny gays and lesbians the basic
protections of Title VII. There is no principled way to distinguish such cases from
those that do not involve homosexual litigants.
Telephone Interview with Samuel Marcosson, Appellate Counsel to the EEOC (Mar. 8,
1996). The referenced statement is purely the personal opinion of Mr. Marcosson and
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Cullen P. Cowley"
does not represent the views of the EEOC. Id.
See also Marcosson, supra note 90, at 31-32 (suggesting that only an express action by
Congress or a Supreme Court decision declaring that homophobic or antigay harassment
"is entitled to a specific exemption from the law forbidding offensive hostile work
environments" can "avoid the conclusion that antigay harassment is included among the
hostile work environments barred by Title VII," and pointing to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "when it simply carved out private
homosexual conduct as a special category of conduct undeserving of protection under the
constitutional right of privacy").
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